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(Commission Mémorandum to the Council of 8 February  1967) 
Further ta a  recent exchange  of  views  on  tax 
harmonization,  the  Commission,  wishing  to 
amplify  and  fill  in  more· detail  in  the docu-
ments  worked  qut  during  these  discussions, 
has  drawn  up a  concrete  programme of  work 
to be undertaken in the tax field. 
When  preparing  this  programme,  the  Com-
mission  started  from  the  principle  thar  har-
monization  must  be  limited to what  is  really 
necessary  either  for  the  establishment  or  for 
the  smooth  functioning  of  the  Common 
Market. 
ln this  respect the date of  1 July  1968 - at 
which  the  last  customs  barriers  between  the 
six  States  will  disappear  and  the  common 
agricultural market will have been fully estab-
lished  - marks  an  important  stage.  This 
time-limit  must  theref6re  be  observed  as  the 
latest  date  by  which  certain  fiscal  measures 
must  have  been  adopted  by  the  Member 
States. 
Consequently, the programme makes a distinc-
tion  between  those  measures  which  would 
have ta be taken before 1 July 1968 and those 
which. could  be  carried · out latet. 
Both  before  and  after  1  July  1968,  indirect 
taxes  (turnover  taxes  and  excise  duties)  and 
direct  taxes  will  both  be  the  subject  of 
harmonization  work. 
W ork to be undertaken in the tax field 
BEFORE  1  JULY  1968 
Indirect taxes 
1.  Turnover  taxes 
A  third  directive  has  been  submitted  laying 
down  the  procedures  relating  to  the  applica-
tion of the value-added  tax  to  agriculture. 
2.  Further  measures  ta  eliminate  discrimi-
nation due  ta  excise  duties 
The main  task  is  ta eliminate  discriminatary 
arrangements surviving in one or severa! states 
in respect of excise duties on spirits and wine, 
sugar,  coffee,  yarns  and  cocoa. 
The  Commission's  work  on  most  of  these 
discriminatory  arrangements  is  nearing  com-
pletion. 
3. ·  Harmonization  of excise  duties 
The work  on  excise  duties  revealed  thar  the 
discriminatory  effects  of certain  excise  duties 
on imported  products  can  only be eliminated 
completely  if the  duties  are  harmonized  in 
such  a  way  thar  at  least  the structural differ-
ences  are  removed.  This  applies  to  the 
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excise  duties  on  manufactured  tobacco,  beer, 
sugar, spirits, and wine. 
In  addition,  the  common  agricultural,  trans-
port and  energy  policies  call  for  the  approx-
imation  of  the  rates  of certain  excise  duties; 
this  applies  in  particular  ta  excise  duties  on 
spirits  and  wine,  diesel  oil,  other  petroleum 
products,  and  sugar.  Approximation  work 
will require prior harmonization of the struc-
tures of these duties. 
For  these  reasons,  it would  be  advisable  ta 
consider  in  the near  future  a  harmonization 
of the  structures  of excise  duties  on: 
i)  Manufactured  tobacco, 
ii)  Spirits  and  wine, 
iii)  Petroleum products  and the like, 
iv)  Sugar  and  sweeteners, 
v)  Beer. 
lt must  be  noted  thar  in the near  future  the 
excise  duties  on  manufactured  tobacco  and 
spirits  and  wine  will  be  harmonized  under 
proposais ro  be worked out in connection with 
agricultural  policy  and  the  adjustment  of 
monopolies. 
3 The  Commission  intends  to  expedite  matters 
in this field. 
4.  Annual raad  tax  on motor vehicles 
As  far  as  possible,  proposais  will  be  submit-
ted  for  the  harmonization  of  structures  and, 
later,  rates.  Harmonization  is  necessary  if 
the  objectives  of  competition  and  transport 
policy  are  to be  attained.  lt would also  meet 
the interests of those States which are contem-
plating adjustment of this tax. 
5.  Indirect  taxes  on insurance  contracts 
The  territoriality  rules  for  these  taxes  will 
have to  be  harmonized.  The aim  is  to work 
out  a  transitional  arrangement  designed  to 
create  the  tax  conditions  necessary  for  the 
establishment  of  freedom  to  supply  services. 
Direct  taxes 
The  proposed  measures  are  required  by  the 
gradua!  liberalization  of  capital  movements, 
the  need  for  structural  reorganization  and  a 
higher  degree  of  industrial combination,  and 
the way competition is  developing in the field 
of  investment. 
1.  Capital  movements 
The aim is  the complete elimination of inter-
national  double  taxation  of  dividends  and 
interest and, in general, the removal of aU  the 
factors  - distortions  or  discriminatory  prac-
tices  - likely  to  engender  abnormal  capital 
movements,  to  maintain  market  segregation 
and to  curb the expansion of savings. 
To  this  end  the  following  measures  are 
required: 
1.  The working out  of  a  harmonized  with-
holding tax  system  on  interest  on  negociable 
bonds  and on dividends wh:ch would provide 
for the amount withheld to  be  set  against the 
beneficary's  total  liability  and  for  reimburse-
ments where too  much tax  has  been  paid; 
2.  The  adjustment  in  Belgium  and  France 
of  certain  procedures  for  the  application  of 
tax  credits  which  are  of  a  discriminatory 
nature; 
3.  The establishment of a  single method for 
relieving  the  total  tax  burd  en  on  dis  tri  buted 
4. 
dividends  (  tax  relief  for  the  company  or  for 
the  shareholder); 
4.  The adjustment and harmonization of the 
tax  implications  of  the  operations  of  invest-
ment  companies  (including  unit  trusts)  with 
a  view  to  eliminating  any  tax  discrimination 
against  investments  through  such  companies 
or trusts  as  compared  with direct  investment; 
5.  The  haëmonization  of  the  tax  arrange-
ments  applicable  to  holding  companies  and 
the amendment  of  certain  regulations. 
II.  Structural  changes  in industry 'and  indus-
trial  combination 
The  aim  is  to  ensure  that  structural  changes 
and amalgamations at Community level which 
appear necessary  if  the  common  market  is  to 
be  developed  further  are  not made  too costly 
and as  a consequence actually prevented by tax 
regulations .. 
To this  end  efforts  are  required: 
1.  To  improve  the  functioning  of  the  tax 
arrangements  applicable  to  parent  companies 
and  subsidiaries  where  these  are  companies 
set  up  in  different  Member  States;  the  same 
applies  to  bath  corpoJation  tax  and  taxation 
at  source; 
2.  To  introduce,  with a  view  to facilitating 
inter alia  the creation of European companies, 
acceptable  tax  arrangements  for  mergers  and 
transfer  of  as sets  .as  between  corn panies  in 
different  Member  States. 
III.  Investment  incentives 
In  arder  to  create  roughly  equal  conditions 
of  competition  with  regard  to  investment 
measures  are  needed: 
1.  To  spell  out  more  clearly  the  obligation 
of  the  Member  States  under  Articles  93  and 
102  to  consult  the  Commission  on  aU  fiscal 
measures  concerning  the  basis  of  assessment 
of  such  corporate  ta:œs  on  company  profits 
as  are  liable  to  constituee  incentives  and 
engender distortions  of competition.  Subject 
to prior consultation, any fiscal measures liable 
to constituee investment incentives should also 
be  harmonized; 
2.  To effect a first alignment of factors  taken 
into account  in calculating the bases of assess-
ment of profits tax, and in particular to estab-
lish certain  basic  rules  for  depreciation. 
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Indirect  taxes 
1.  Turnover  taxes 
In connection with the harmonization of turn-
over  taxes,  a  fourth  directive  will  have  to  be 
submitted  on  the  removal  of  the  fiscal  frou-
tiers  to  intra-Community  trade. 
Proposais  will  have  to  be  submitted  concern-
ing the additional arrangements for  the appli-
cation  of the common  system  of  tax  on  value 
added.  These  are  provided for  in the second 
directive. 
2.  Excise  duties 
a)  Proposais will have to be worked out with 
a  view  to the removal of fiscal  frontiers  con-
cerning  the  excise  duties  which  the  Member 
States  are  agreed  to harmonize  (manufactured 
tobacco,  petroleum  products,  spirits,  etc.); 
b)  Proposais  will  have  to  be  drawn  up  on 
how  to  handle  the  other  excise  duties  exist-
ing in  one  or  more  than  one  member  coun-
try  (yarns, mineral water,  etc.  and coffee,  tea, 
salt,  etc.)  which have to be either harmonized 
or abolished  or maintained  without  harmoni-
zation. 
3.  Indirect  taxes  on  insurance  contracts 
Proposais  will  have  to  be  submitted  with  a 
view  to  the  harmonization  of these  taxes. 
4.  Indirect  taxes  on  capital  movements 
Proposais  will  have  to  be  submitted  with  a 
view to the harmonization of the indirect taxes 
on the stock exchange transactions and, where 
these  exist,  stamp duties,  etc. 
Direct  taxes 
Generally  speaking,  the  efforts  towards  an 
alignment  of direct  taxes  should  lead  to: 
1.  The harmonization of  certain  structures: 
a)  Schedular  taxes. 
b)  Present  taxes  on  company  assets,  which 
would  probably have  to  be  abolished. 
2.  A  uniform  definition  and  method  of 
calculation  of  taxable  corporate  profits.  To 
this end the provisions initially planned would 
have  to  be  supplemen.ted  with  regard  to 
depreciation,  and  new  provisions  would  have 
to  be  introduced  regarding  the  tax  treatment 
of  the  appreciation  in  value  of  fixed  assets, 
the  valuation  of  stocks,  the  carrying  over  of 
lasses  to  subsequent  years,  and  tax-exempt 
general and  special reserves.  Measures adopt-
ed  as  incentives  and  departing  from  these 
provisions  would  then  only  be  permissible  if 
they  were  fully  co-ordinated  to  comply  with 
general economie policy; 
3.  Sufficient  alignment  of  the  rates  of cor-
poration tax  in  the  six  countries; 
4.  Co-ordination  of  the  methods  of  control 
and  collection,  without  which  harmonization 
would  not  have  the  desired  effect. 
Lastly,  measures  should  be  taken  to eliminate 
permanently  those  cases  of international  dou-
ble  taxation  which harmonization itself would 
not eliminate. 
Programme for  the harmonization of direct  taxes 
(Commission  Memorandum  to  the  Council  of 26  June  1967) 
The aim of this programme is  to describe in detail the conditions under which certain  current tax 
problems  arise  and to  propose  solutions  to these  problems.  The questions  involved  concern  in 
the  main  capital  movements,  industrial  combination  and  investments.  In  arder  to  fit  these 
problems  into  their  general  context  the  Commission  has  preferred  to  start  by  setting  out  the 
reasons  and prerequisites ·for the approximai  on  of direct taxes  in the six  countries  and  describing 
the objectives to be attained by approximation over the long term. 
Outline  programme:  Reasons  and  objectives 
I.  Reasons  and  prerequisites  for  the approx-
imation  of direct taxes  in the six  countries 
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II.  Long-term  objectives  of  approximation 
Urgent  problems: 
measures 
Facts  and  suggested 
5 6 
I.  Capital  movements 
A.  Withholding  tax  on  dividend  and 
bond  interest 
B.  Alignment  of  the  French  system  of 
fiscal  daim  and  the  Belgian  system  of 
tax  credit 
C.  Investments  made  through  invest-
ment  companies 
D.  Preferential  treatment  of  certain 
holding  companies 
II.  Industrial  combination 
A.  Mergers 
B.  Acquisition  of holdings 
III.  Depreciation 
A.  "Normal"  depreciation 
B.  Special  depreciation 
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OUTLINE  PROGRAMME 
REASONS AND OBJECTIVES 
1. Reasons  and  prerequisites  for  the  ap-
proximation  of  direct  taxes  in the  six 
co  un  tries 
1.  It now appears to be generally recognized 
that there  is  a  need  for  a  certain  approxima-
tion  of  the systems  of  direct  taxation  in  the 
-member  countries  of  the  EEC. 
Before  setting  out  the  ultimate  aims  of  the 
approximation  of  direct  taxes,  an  account 
must  therefore  be  given of the economie  and 
social  objectives  to  be  attained: 
a)  So  that conditions of fair competition can 
be  established  between  the  Member  States, 
the cost of production amd  the yield of invested 
· capital  must  not  be  influenced  by  taxation 
in  a  way  which  differs  too  widely  from  one 
country  to  the other. 
b)  The movement  of capital  and  the choice 
of locality  for  the investment must not hinge 
on  considerations  of  a  purely  fiscal  nature 
but must  be  determined  mainly  by  economie 
and  social  factors  and  must  ensure  the  opti-
mum utilization  of the funds  and  the factors 
of production of the Community. 
c)  The  growth  and  consolidation  of  under-
takings,  their  reorganization  and,  more  gene-
rally,  reform  of  the  structure  of  production 
and  distribution  must  be  facilitated,  not 
impeded, by  the tax  systems. 
Any tax obstacles to the amalgamations which 
will  be  needed  if enterprises  are  to  adjust 
themselves  to  the  scale  of  the  Common 
Market  and  if the  firms  of  the  Community 
are to hold their own  against  competition  on 
the  world  market  (mergers  and  acquisitions 
of holdings at  national and Community--l.evel, 
creation  of European  companies,  activities  of 
associations of enterprises, etc.)  must therefore 
be eliminated.  Any tax provisions which are 
prejudicial  to  small  and  medium-scale  enter-
prises will also  have to be  modified. 
d)  It will  have  to be  possible  to ensure,  in 
the  framework  of  the  Community's  general 
policy  arul  in  keeping  with  the  common 
policies  adopted  in certain fields,  the  co-ordi-
nation  of  the  policies  of  the  Member  States 
and the use of taxation as  a means of econom-
.,.,  ic  and  social  intervention. 
2.  A  study of the main  aspects  of corporate 
taxation  and  work  done  in co-operation  with 
government  experts  have  confirmed  that  the 
differences in the structures of the tax systems, 
the existence of arrangements which are more 
favourable  in  sorne  countries  than  in  others, 
.r  the strictly national objectives  pursued  by the 
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individual  countries  in  the  tax  field,  double 
or multiple taxation as  a result of the simUlta-
neous  or  successive  application  of  the  tax 
rules of severa!  countries to one and the same 
transaction  (despite  conventions  for  the 
avoidance  of  double  taxation)  are  all  liable 
to impede the smooth working of the Common 
Market. 
The  aim  must  therefore  be  to  arrive  at  an 
approximation  of  the  structures,  at  a  certain 
approximation  of  the  rates  and  at·  the  total 
elimination of double taxation. 
But  the  short-term  as  well  as  the  long-term 
measures to be envisaged must, like the process 
which  is  to  lead  up  to  them,  meet  certain 
conditions: 
a)  While  any  measure , proposed  must  of 
course be in line with the economie and social 
objectives  of the Common Market,  it must at 
the same time represent a solution conforming 
with modern theory in the field.  In addition, 
each  tax  must  be  evaluated  in  the  overall 
context  to which  it  belongs;  it  must  remain 
an  internally consistent  unit and  its  structure 
must not be distorted by too many adaptations 
or  concessions  to  special  situations; 
b)  The recommended  measures  of harmoni-
zation  must,  even  over  the  long  term,  leave 
the Member States  sufficient power to admin-
iser  the  revenue  under  the  budget  and  suf-
ficient  room  for  manoeuvre to take,  if neces-
sary,  differentiated measures to influence their 
· economies in the framework of the Commun-
ity  policy; 
c)  Sooner or later the question  of allocating 
revenues  among  the  Member .  States  will  be 
raised,  particularly  in  cases  where  central 
handling of taxation, for  instance in the coun-
try of residence,  would appear to 'be  the best 
way  of  avoiding  double  taxation,  ensuring 
equal tax treatment and simplifying formalities 
for the taxpayer.  A study is  therefore needed 
at  once of ways  and means  of allocating total 
tax  revenue.  Such  methods  would  have  to 
replace  the  system  currently  in  operation 
between  Member  States  of  providing  for 
offsetting  arrangements  almost ·transaction  by 
transaction.  A · success  in  this  field  would 
greatly  facilitate  all  problems  of  harmoniza-
tion  and  would  lighten  the  burden weighing 
on both tax authorities and enterprises; 
d)  Lastly, many measures designed to approx-
imate  legislation  or  align  underlying  tax 
theory  will  serve  little  purpose  unless  the 
methods of inspection, verification and collec-
tion  are also  harmonized.  There is  therefore· 
a need for parallel action in this field. 
7-II.  Long-term  objectives  of approximation 
1.  The  ultimate  objective  of  the  process  of 
approximation of the tax systems in the Mem-
ber  States  must  fit  into  the  economie  frame-
work and meet the conditions indicated above. 
As  pointed out already, the tax revenue of the 
six  Community  countries  should,  over  the 
long  term,  be  made  up  mainly  of  receipts 
from: 
a)  A  tax on value added, harmonized to the 
greatest  possible  degree,  and  sorne  major 
excise  duties,  also  harmonized; 
b)  A general tax on company profits, having 
the  same  structure  throughout  the  Commun-
ity  and  based  on  broadly  similar methods  of 
assessment  and  rates; 
c)  A  single  comprehensive  persona!  income 
tax  which  admittedly  may  differ  from  one 
member country to the other for  a  long time 
to come. 
The  problems  to  be  solved  in  the  field  of 
direct  taxation  therefore  relate  mainly  to  the 
taxation  of  enterprises  (particularly  campa-
nies),  of profits  and  of distributed  dividends. 
The following  is  an  outline of  the  results  to 
be  aimed  at. 
2.  Complete  harmonization  of overall  struc-
tures 
This  result  will  be  achieved  by: 
i)  The elimination  of the  schedular  income 
taxes  still existing and the introduction of the 
same  type  of  corporation  tax  throughout  the 
Community; 
ii)  The  elimination  of  those  taxes  on  com-
pany  assets  the  narure  of  which  involves 
discrimination  against  capital-intensive  firms; 
iii)  The  adaptation  to  the  homogeneous 
structure  of the  above-mentioned  major  taxes 
of the direct taxes  local  authorities impose on 
enterprises. 
3.  Harmonization  of  the  structures  and 
approximation  of the  rates  of corpotation  tax 
in the EEC 
The  problem  of  the  strucrure  of  corporation 
tax lies  in  the  fact  that  sorne  Member  States 
have  introduced  methods  calculaied  to  reduce 
the  double  taxation  of  dividends  occurring 
at two levels by the taxing of company profits 
and  the  taxing  of  the  shareholder'  s  persona! 
income.  These  methods  consist  in  either 
reducing  the  rate  of  corporation  tax  for 
distributed  profits  (Germany)  or  in  granting 
the shareholder a  "tax credit", i.e.  in allowing 
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him  to  deduct  from  the  amount  of his  per-
sona!  income  tax  part  of  the  corporation  tax 
paid  by  the  enterprise  distributing  the  divi-
dends (Belgium, France). 
In  the short term it may be  permissible to let 
the two methods run side by  side despite their 
questionable  implications  and despite  the dif-
ficulties  that  are  bound  to  arise  if efforts  are 
made  to  avoid  certain  effects.  A  correction 
is  none  the  less  indispensable  of  certain 
effects  of  the  French  system  of  fiscal  daims 
and  the  Belgian  system  of  tax  credit  which 
may adversely affect the movements of capital. 
This  problem  will  be  dealt  with  in  a  later 
chapter. 
In the long term it will, however, be necessary 
to  adopt  a  single  method  for  the  whole  of 
the  Community.  No  doubt  methods  other 
than  the  one  used  at  present  might  be  con-
templated  to  reduce  the  burden  weighing on 
dividends as  a result of the taxing of company 
profits  on the one hand and  of the sharehol-
der's  income  on  the  other.  lt would,  for 
instance,  be possible to lower the rate  of cor-
poration  tax  irrespective  of  the  way  profits 
are used, or to deduct from taxable profits -
up  to  a  certain  percentage  of  the  invested 
capital - the  dividends  distributed  to  share-
holders,  or  to  consider  only  part  of the  divi-
dends  received  by  the shareholder as  counting 
towards the total of his  taxable income.  The 
solution  to  be  adopted  eventually  would, 
however, have to allow of a sufficient approx-
imation of the rates of corporation tax  applic-
able in  the six member countries. 
4.  Approximation of the bases  of assessment 
for  taxes  on  company  profits 
In the long term i  t will be necessary  to arrive 
at  a  common  definition  of  taxable  company 
profits  and  a  common  method  of  calculating 
them so  that the basis  of assessment  is  harm-
onized  to  the  greatest  possibl~  extent. 
The  de?ree  of  precision  of  the  harmonized 
rules  will  depend  on  the elements  taken  into 
account for calculating taxable profits. 
For depreciation, certain  rules will have to be 
kept  to  with  regard  to  the  time  at  which 
depreciation  is  deemed  to  begin, the methods 
of calculation  and  the extent to which depre-
ciation  arrangements  are  compulsory;  meas-
ures  departing  from  the  general  rules  and 
constituting special  investment  incentives  will 
have to be approved through a  prîor consulta-
tion  procedure.  These  measures,  set  out  in 
one of the following chapters,  would  have  to 
be taken rapidly. 
There  will  also  have  to  be  precise  rules  to 
govern  the  tax  treatment  of  appreciation  of 
assets  in  the  course  of  the  operation  of  a 
business  and to align  sufficiently the methods 
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the constitution of  reserves.  A  description of 
the  possible  solutions  to  the  different  prob-
lems  will follow  lat  er. 
5.  Approximation  of  the  tax  arrangements 
applicable  to  parent  companies  and  subsidia-
ries,  to  company  mergers  and  winding- up 
operations 
In the  long run these  arrangements  will  have 
to  be  harmonized  in  the EEC  so  that  it will 
not  be  mainly  fiscal  considerations  which 
determine  whether  and  how  firms  should 
purchase  interlocking  holdings,  merge  or  go 
into  liquidation. 
In  the  short  term,  the  immediate  aim  must 
be  to  remove  the  tax  obstacles,  i.e.  to  make 
the  tax  cost  of  these  transactions  acceptable 
if the parties to them are companies set up in 
different Member States.  These problems will 
be  dealt wi th in a lat  er chapt  er. 
6.  Harmonization  of  the  systems  of  with-
holding tax on dividend and interest 
Although in principle an  advance payment of 
persona!  income  tax  and  for  this  reason  out-
side  the  scope  of  the  proposed  general  pro-
gramme  of  harmonization,  the  withholding 
tax  generally  levied  on  distributed  company 
dividends  and  interest  paid  to  bondholders 
is  a  source  of  serious  difficulties.  As  these 
difficulties, which should be overcome without 
delay,  are  of  topical  importance,  they  are 
dealt  with  below. 
7.  Multilateral  convention 
Lastly,  a  multilateral  convention  should  be 
drawn  up  for  the  avoidance  of  such  double 
taxation  phenomena  as  would  not  disappear 
completely in spite of harmonization measures 
planned. 
ln the preceding account of the ultimate objec-
tives  to  be attained, special  mention  has  been 
made  of certain  measures  relating to  particu-
larly  urgent  problems. 
To allow for  an examination in greater detail, 
these  measures,  which  are  listed  among  the 
questions to be  solved  before 1 July 1968, are 
divided  into  three  chapters: 
i)  Capital  movements 
ii)  Industrial combination 
iii)  Depreciation. 
URGENT  PROBLEMS  FACTS  AND  SUGGESTED  MEASURES 
1.  Capital movements  ing from  other  than  the traditional economie 
or  financial  considerations. 
The efforts made to ensure the free movement 
of capital  between  the countries  of  the Corn-
mon  Market,  overcome  the  fràgmentation  of 
the capital markets and create a truly common 
capital  market,  give  rise  to  problems  of  a 
fiscal  nature: 
i)  Not  only  the  consequences  of  the  simul-
taneous  or  combined  application  of  the  tax 
rules  of  two  or  more  countries  to  one  and 
the same  transaction  (case  of double  or  mul-
tiple  taxation  or  the  creation  of tax  havens) 
ii)  But also  the effect  of  the mere existence 
in  certain  member  countries  of  tax  rules 
favouring certain groups of taxpayers  or types 
of  investment  more  than  the  corresponding 
rules  do in other countries. 
Taxation  is  therefore: 
i)  A major obstacle to the free  movement of 
capital and  the interpenetration  of the capital 
markets,  and 
ii)  One  of  the  main  causes  of  "abnormal" 
capital  movements,  i.e.  of  movements  spring-
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In the long  run the  remedy  for  such  a  situa-
tion  lies  in the  alignment  and  harmonization 
of the tax  systems  of  the  individual  Member 
States,  the  aim  being  the  creation  of  fiscal 
neutrality  - which  is  indispensable  for  the 
free  play  of  the  forces  of  competition  -
with  a  continuous  adjustment  of  taxation  to 
the economie policy  pursued by  the Commun-
ity. 
A  solution  would  thus  have  to  be  found  to 
all  tax  problems  relating  to  capital  move-
ments  and  the  utilization  of  funds  in  the 
Community,  irrespective  of  whether  it  is  a 
question  of simple  portfolio investment trans-
actions  or  of  investments  more  directly  con-
nected  with  the  operation,  the  management 
and  the  control  of  enterprises  or  groups  of 
enterprises. 
Meanwhile,  practical  solutions  must  be  found 
to  certain  tax  problems  connected,  in  parti-
cular,  with  investment  capital  since  obstacles 
other than fiscal ones to the movement of these 
funds  are  being gradually removed. 
9 In practice this  refers to. 
a)  The  systems  of  withholding tax  charged 
on  dividends  and  interest, 
b)  Methods  of  reducing  the  economie  dou-
ble  taxation  of dividends, 
c)  Discrepancies  in  the  tax  arrangements 
applicable to  holding companies, 
d)  Tax  treatment  of  income  from  invest-
ments  handled  by  financial  intermediaries, 
particularly hy the various types of investment 
company. 
A.  Withholding  tu on dividend  and  bond  interest 
The  withholding  of  tax  at  source,  although 
in  principle  only  an  advance  payment  of 
persona!  income  tax,  is  of  threefold  interest 
to any State,  because: 
i)  It  is  a  means  of  speeding  up  the  flow 
of revenue; 
ii)  It cuts back the loss of receipts  due to tax 
fraud,  as  the  tax  withheld  is  irrecoverable 
unless  a  tax  return  is  made  in  respect  of the 
income  against  which  the  tax  has  been 
withheld; 
iii)  It enables the State to assert its tax daim 
in  international  transactions  and  to  secure 
part  of  the  tax  eventually  charged  on  the 
income  involved  when  it  is  paid  to  a  non-
resident. 
This  explains  why  the  States  ding  to  this 
type  of  taxation  particularly  in  international 
transactions. 
There  is  a  wide  range  of  rates  charged  as 
withholding  tax  on  dividend  and  interest  at 
the  leve!  of  each  Member  State  and  in  the 
framework  of  the  30  bilateral  groupings 
possible  among  the  Six.  The  rate  for  the 
same  income  may  vary  from  0  to  30%.  In 
addition,  the  total  tax  eventually  borne  by 
the  recipient  of  dividend  or  interest  varies 
with  the  EEC  country  in  which  the  income 
arises.  This  discrepancy  is  due  to  the  fact 
that,  depending  on  the  individual  case,  the 
tax  withheld  at  source  is  not,  is  only  partly 
or is  totally  charged  to  persona!  tax  liability, 
or is  even  refunded. 
Added  to  these  discrepancies  there  are  diff()!r-
ences  in  the  methods  and  the  efficiency  of 
the  control  of  the  final  tax  charged  on  divi-
dend  and  interest  paid  to  residents  of  the 
Member  States.  The  situation  in  the  EEC 
is  as  follows: 
i)  There  are  systematic  supervision  arran-
gements in sorne countries;  this  is  the case  in 
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France  and  in  Italy1  for  dividend  in general; 
any  dividend  received  in  these  countries  is 
immediately  reported  to  the  revenue  depart-
ment.  In  France  the  same  applies  also  to 
bond interest, even if the creditor opts  to pay 
the  flat-rate  deduction  of  25%  in  full  dis-
charge  of  his  persona!  income  tax  liability. 
Dividend  and  bond  interest  paid  to  foreign 
creditors,  however,  escape  supervision  unless 
the  creditor  daims  the  benefit  of  a  double 
taxation convention; 
ii)  In  other  countries  investment  income 
may  be  received  without  systematic  notifica-
tion  to  the  revenue  department;  this  is  the 
situation  in  the  other  Member  StateS  with 
regard  to  dividend  and  bond  interest  -
except  in Italy  where the rule applies  only to 
bond  interest  - unless  the  creditor  daims 
the  benefit  of  a  double  taxation  convention. 
The situation facing the recipients of dividend 
or  bond  interest  therefore  varies: 
i)  From country to country, 
ii)  In one and the same Member State accord-
ing to the country where the income arises, 
iii)  In  one  and  the  same  Member  State 
sometimes according to whether the income is 
collected  in  this  State  or abroad. 
As  a  result  there  are  the following  disadvan-
tages: 
i)  In spite  of conventions  for  the avoidance 
of  double  taxation  conduded  between  Mem-
ber  States,  the withholding  of  tax  at  source 
results  in  many  cases  in  double  taxation, 
either  because  conventions  do  not  yet  exist 
(Germany  - Belgium,"  Italy  - Luxembourg, 
Luxembourg  - Netherlands), or do  not cover 
incarne  from  securities  (Belgium  - Nether-
lands)  or  because  sorne  of  them,  being very 
old,  are  no  longer  appropriate ta.  present-day 
tax  systems.  These  instances  of double  taxa-
tion  impede  the  movements  of  capital  and 
make  for  the  fragmentation  of  the  capital 
markets; 
ii)  The  bilateral  conventions  ~rrently  in 
force  are  based  on  differing  and  sometimes • 
even  conflicting  prin  ci ples  so  that  the 
methods  used  to  eliminate  double  taxation 
vary greatly from one country to another; this 
is  one first source of difficulties. Much greater 
difficulties  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  con-
ventions are applied in a way which very often 
requires  compliance  with  formalities  by  tax-
payers and paying agencies for each individual 
payment.  To  qualify  for  the  application  of 
1  In  Italy  thé  supervision  arrangements  are  of an 
even  more  rigid  nature  because  as  a  general  rule 
share.s_  m~st be-registered  in the  owner's  name. 
2  The  Convention  has  been  signed  but  bas  not 
yet  been  ratified.  _ 
s.  8.-1967 a  convention,  the  taxpayer  is  in  most  cases 
bound: 
a)  Either to submit, prior to the receipt of a 
dividend  or  interest  payment,  to  the  paying 
agency  a  certificate  of  residence  certified  by 
his revenue office. this certificate is  then being 
-sent  to  the  country  in  which  the  income  is 
earned  so  thar  the  rate  of  tax  withheld  on 
payment  is  thar  provided  for  by  the  conven-
tion, 
b)  Or to file, after receipt of the income on 
which the normal rate of withholding tax has 
been charged in the country of origin, through 
the  paying  agency  an  application  in  thar 
country asking for a  refund, the rime elapsing 
till the refund is  made being sometimes rather 
long.  , 
In many cases  these formalities  are  so  compli-
cated thar individuals waive the benefit of the 
conventions  and  accept  double taxation. 
Lastly,  these differences  in the methods  prov-
ided  for  in  the conventions  and  the  compli-
cated  application  procedures  are  a  further 
factor  discouraging  certain  investors  from 
committing their funds  abroad. 
a)  If the tax withheld exceeds  the  tax  liabi-
lity  of  the  beneficiary,  his  income  is  over-
taxed  unless  the  amount  paid  in  excess  is 
refunded.  At present not always  effected  for 
income  earned  at  home,  this  repayment  is 
never  made  for  income  of  foreign  origin 
because  States  refuse  to  "refund"  taxes  not 
collected  by  them; 
b)  If the beneficiary does  not file  an in  come 
tax rerurn or if he is  exempted without possi-
bility  of  refund,  the  tax  withheld  represents 
in practice a final tax in full discharge of per-
sona! income tax liability. 
The  consequence  of  disparities  in  the  with-
holding  tax  rates  applicable  in  the  various 
countries,  then,  is  thar  the  tax  burden  on 
income from securities varies  according to the 
country  where  it  is  earned;  it  is  therefore 
only natural thar funds should have a tendency 
to flow into countries where the rate is  lowest. 
This  tendency  is  particularly  pronounced  in 
the case  of interest,  which,  unlike  dividends, 
has  not been  reduced  by  an  amount  due  as 
corporation tax and for which the withholding 
tax  represents  the  only  tax  burden.  In  this 
case  the  differences  between  the  countries 
take on added importance since they influence 
directly  the  cost  of  borrowing,  which  is 
already  particularly  sensitive  to  the  forces  of 
supply  and  demand;  these  differences,  the 
EEC  Monetary Committee has  already pointed 
out,  may  by  themselves  induce  major  move-
ments  of  capital. 
~ To sum up,  it must  therefore  be  emphasized . 
thar - even if modified by the existing dou-
ble  taxation  conventions  - the  withholding 
s.  8- 1967 
of tax at source as  practised at the moment in 
the  member  countries  remains  a  frequent 
cause  of double  taxation  or over-taxation  and 
complication for  the investor, and is  the basic 
reason  for  abnormal  movements  of  capital. 
It  is  therefore  an  obstacle  to  the  free  and 
sound movement of capital in the Community 
and to  a  better interpenetration of the capital 
markets  of the member countries. 
To  remedy  this  situation  there  has  to  be  a 
certain  harmonization of  the  arrangements  at 
present  governing  the withholding of  tax  on 
dividend  and  bond  interest. 
1.  To  avoid  any  double  taxation,  the  corn-
mon  system  to  be  adopted  must  first  of  all 
provide  for  restoring  to  the  withholding  tax 
its  basic  character of an  advance  payment  and 
therefore for enabling the beneficiary to obtain 
a  refund  of  tax  paid  in  excess  if he  has  no 
tax liability or only limited tax liability. 
2.  Two  methods  may  therefore  be  contem-
plated  for  overcoming the problem  of  abnor-
mal  capital  movements. 
The  first  method  consists  in  ensuring  by  all 
available  means  automatic  and  efficient  veri-
fication  of incomes  collected  within the Com-
munity  by  individuals  residing  in one  of  the 
six  member  countries.  Such  a  very  strict 
system  could  for  instance  be  operated  by 
generally  introducing  the  French  "coupon 
schedule"  system  which  calls  for  close  co-
operation  between  the  Member  States  and 
active  collaboration  of  the  banks  and  other 
paying  agencies;  co-oper;1tion  on  this  scale 
is,  however, unknown in severa!  Member Sta-
tes,  where  the  principle  of  banking  secrecy 
would  also  be  an  obstacle. 
In this  case  the  rate  of tax withheld  by  each 
country is  of no practical importance and may 
even  be  nil;  what  matters  is  that  any  tax 
withheld  could  be  fully  charged  to  persona! 
incarne  tax  liability  and  should  if  necessary 
be  reimbursable  in  part  or  in  full.  Such  a 
system  offers  the  great  advantage  of  making 
it possible to eliminate withholding tax within 
the  EEC  and  thus  to  introduce  taxation  of 
incarne in the country of residence only and to 
provide  a  better  guarantee  that  the  progres-
sive  tax scale  is  applied. 
It must,  however,  be pointed out that such an 
arrangement, which would  mean  a  very  wide 
disparity between the tax  rules  applied within 
the Common Market and the tax rules applied 
in  certain  rron-member  countries,  would  be 
liable to engender capital moveinents not from 
one member country to another but from  the 
Community  to  non-member  countries.  The 
solution  to  be  adopted  should  therefore  not 
be based on technical tax  considerations alone 
l1 but should also take into account the economie 
and  social  interests  of  the  Community  as  a 
whole. 
In  contrast  to  this,  a  second  arrangement, 
while in principle making the withholding tax 
retain  its  character  of  being  claimable  and 
reimbursable,  ~:onsists  in  waiving  for  the 
time  being  the  extension  of  the  automatic 
control  procedure  to  all  EEC  residents.  lt 
must,  however,  be  realized  that  in  this  case 
all  taxpayers  would  in  practice  be  'free  to 
collect  their  income  without  the  revenue 
departments'  knowledge  - in  their  own 
country or in another member country - and 
that  thus  sorne  of  them  would  prefer  to 
consider  the  withholding tax  as  irrecoverable 
and  not  daim  for  it  against  persona!  tax 
liability.  For  this  reason  this  solution  must 
provide for the application of a common with-
holding  tax  rate  every  time  income  is  paid 
to  an  EEC  resident  but  not  reported  to  the 
revenue  department  at  the  time  of payment. 
ln view  of  current  taxation  practice  in most 
Member  States  and  the  prospect  of complete 
liberalization  of  capital  movements  in  the 
EEC,  this  arrangement  would  appear  more 
realistic,  and  the  general  principle  involved 
should  be  adopted,  at  least  initially:  this 
arrangement  does  not  preclude  later  adapta-
tion  to  a  very  strict  general  inspection  and 
verification  system·  and  the  elimination  of 
withholding  tax  or  to a  system  offering  the 
taxpayer  an  opportunity  to  opt  for  a  tax 
withheld  at  source  in  discharge  of  all  other 
tax  liability  in  respect  of  the  income  con-
cerned. 
To sum up, the main lines of a common solu-
tion to the problem of withholding tax could 
be  as  follows: 
f!)  To avoid  double taxation in a way  which 
!S  satisfactory  in  principle  as  well  as  in 
practice,  it would be  appropriate: 
i)  In  all  cases  to  make  the withholding tax 
once  again  an  advance  payment,  both  in  the 
relations between the Six and in the individual 
member  countries; 
ii)  To avoid  the  numerous  and  complicated 
formalities  to  be  complied  with  at  present 
by  the  recipients  of  incomes  and  the  paying 
agencies  if  double  taxation  is  to  be  avoided 
effective!  y. 
In  practice  this  means  that: 
i)  Any  tax  withheld  at  source  would  have 
to  be allowed  in full for tax  purposes  and be 
reimbursed  to  the extent  that  it  exceeds  the 
beneficiary'  s tax  liability or if the beneficiary 
is  not liable  to  tax; 
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ii)  In  the  relations  between  the  Member 
States,  reimbursement  would ·al  ways  have  to 
be  made  by  the  revenue  departments  of  the 
country of domicile as if the incomes involved 
had  been  collected  in that country. 
The  application  of  such  a  principle  could 
undoubtedly  result  in  reimbursement  by  one 
State  of  tax  which  it  had  not  collected;  the 
States  could,  however,  make  the  desired 
adjustments  through  appropriate  equalization 
payments  effected  on  an  overall  basis  instead 
of from  case  to  case  as  is  being  done  today. 
b)  To  avoid  abnormal  capital  movements, 
there should be common rates for tax withheld 
at source in the EEC: 
i)  For  dividends  a  rate  of  25%  appears 
feasible.  This  is  the  rate  applied  by  several 
Member States; 
ii)  For  bond  interest,  a  lower  rate  appears 
to  be  called  for:  interest  payments  are  sorne-
times  subject  to a  lower  rate  of  withholding 
tax  or  are  even  exempt  from  this  tax.  In 
certain  cases  or  within  certain  limit  interest 
payments  can  even be totally tax-exempt. 
The  introduction  of  a  withholding  tax  of 
25%  on  bond  interest  in  countries  which  at 
the  moment  do  not  withhold  tax  on  such 
income would  lead  to serious  disturbances  on 
the bond markets of thesé countries.  Various 
reforms  of  this  type  show  the  considerable 
influence  changes  in  the  rate  of  withholding 
tax have exerted on capital movements in the 
recent  past.  The rate of  10%  is  probably a 
maximum if disturbances on the bond markets 
are  to  be  avoided. 
lt may  be  held  that even  at  a  rate  of  10% 
the introduction of a withholding tax is  liable 
to  lead  to  a  diversion  of certain  issues  from 
the  EEC  countries  not  charging  such  a  tax 
at  the  moment  to  non-member  countries. 
Given  the  international  mobility  of  capital, 
borrowers  tend  to  compare  yields  net  of  all 
tax;  as  long as  there  are  countries  which  do 
not  charge  a withholding tax,  the tax  burden 
will therefore tend to weigh only on  the deb-
tor  without  affecting  the creditor.  The pri-
vate  borrower  is  the one  mainly  affected  by 
this  charge;  for  public  authorities  calling  on 
the  capital  market  the  charge  is  generously 
compensated  by  tax  revenue  corresponding to 
the tax withheld. 
c)  ln order to confer  a certain flexibility on 
the  system  and  not  to  jeopardize  later  deve-
lopments  leading  towards  a  common  system 
of  rigid  control  accompanied  by  the  elimi-
nation  of  the  withholding  tax  or  conversely 
towards  the charging of a withholding tax  in 
full  discharge  of  any  other  tax  liability,  the 
Member ·States  could,  however,  reduce  the 
common  rates  or even  abolish  the practice  of 
tax  deduction  at  source: 
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of  the  income  is  informed  immediately  by 
the paying agency of any payment of dividend 
or  interest; 
ii)  If the  recipient  is  exempt  from  tax,  for 
instance,  where  the  recipient  is  a  parent 
company. 
Obviously  the  question  must  be  raised  as  to 
whether  the  first,  rather  general  exception  is 
necessary:  it  must  be  admi  tted  that,  once 
capital movements have  been  liberalized  com-
pletely,  the  supervision  systems  at  present  in 
force will in practice, if not de  jure, lose their 
strict  compulsory  nature,  as  taxpayers  will 
always  be  able to escape  the automatic opera-
tion of the system by collecting their incomes, 
even  if earned  in  their own  country,  in ano-
ther  country  in  which  such  supervision  does 
not exist.  But  it will in practice not pay for 
the  shareholder to act  like this  unless  the tax 
due exceeds the amount he is  entitled to daim 
for,  i.e.  is  higher  than  the  withholding  tax 
(compulsory  in this case)  plus  any  tax  credit 
- in France a sum equal to the net dividend 
collected.  This sum  being very  high,  such  a 
practice  will  be  of  interest  to  a  very  small 
number of persons only.  Most taxpayers will 
continue  to  prefer  the  present  system  of 
supervision  with elimination of the withhold-
ing tax.  To  compel  France  to  re-introduce 
a 25% withholding tax on the dividends  paid 
to  residents  would  entail  many  refunds  and 
would  therefore  complicate  the  system.  In 
the  final  analysis,  supervision  and  conse-
quently  the exception to be made in this  case 
therefore  appear  to  be  useful  suggestions. 
The second  exception  which is  to be made if 
the beneficiary is  not liable to tax  appears  to 
be  self-explanatory:  one  cannot  see  why  in 
this case  a withholding tax should be charged 
which  would  have  to  be  reimbursed  later. 
It should  also  be  noted  that by  providing for 
the reimbursement or elimination of the with-
holding tax, this system solves the problem of 
withholding tax  on  dividends  in the  relations 
between  parent  companies  and  subsidiaries. 
d)  Lastly,  the  common  withholding  tax 
system as  outlined above would be useless if it 
did  not  predude  the  possibility  of  other 
deductions  being made. 
The Member  States  which  at  present  make  a 
deduction  on  incomes  from  other  Member 
States  would,  for  instance,  have  to  abandon 
this  system. 
B.  Alignment  of  the  Frenc:h  system  of fisc:al  c:laim 
and  the  Belgian  system  of  tax  c:redit 
Generally speaking, the system  of fiscal  daim 
or tax  credit  in operation  in  France  and  Bel-
gium  consists  in ·  allowing  the  shareholder  to 
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deduct  from  the  amount  of  persona!  tax  lia-
bility a portion of the corporation tax paid by 
the  company  distributing  the  dividend.  In 
France,  a  reimbursement  is  also  made  if the 
taxpayer's  liability  is  too  small  to  allow  such 
deduction.  In  Belgium, a  flat-rate  allowance 
is  granted which can  never  take  the  form  of 
reimbursement. 
Seen as  an  alleviation of the tax burden on the 
recipients  of  dividends  (comprehensive  per-
sona!  income  tax  or  corporation  tax),  this 
system  benefits  only  individuals  or  compa-
nies  liable  to  such  taxes  in  France  or  Bel-
gium,  i.e.  in  principle,  residents  of  these 
countries. 
In  the two  countries,  however,  the  deduction 
applies  only  to  dividend  distrbuted  by  com-
panies established in the country itself and not 
to dividend paid out by foreign  companies. 
The question  therefore  arises  as  to  what  the 
practical  effects  of  this  measure  have  been. 
Are  these  effects  acceptable  if  measured 
against  the  present  state  of  development  of 
the  Common  Market  or  should  there  not  be 
attempts  to modify them by  asking the conn-
tries  concerned  to  adjust  their  rules?  What 
points should be  modified? 
There is  general  agreement  on  the first  ques-
tion:  from  a  practical,  if  not  strictly  legal 
point of view,  the measures  have sorne  discri-
minatory  effect  incompatible  with  the  deve-
lopment of  the Common  Market and  particu-
larly  with  the  increasingly  complete  liberali-
zation  of  capital  movements  and  the  inter-
penetration of the capital markets. 
Here,  however,  there  are  conflicting  theories 
based  in  particular on the fact  that the meas-
ures  at present in force  provide for  a twofold 
exception: 
i)  Dividends  on  foreign  shares  do  not  qua-
lify for tax deduction; 
ii)  Non-residents  cannot  daim  any  tax 
alleviation. 
1.  The  first  theory  accepts  the  way  the 
system is presented as  leading to a reduction of 
the  persona!  income  tax  of  shareholders,  no 
allowance  being  made  for  the  precedent  set 
by  Germany, which grants  a simple  reduction 
of the rate of corporation tax for  the distribu-
ted  portion  of  profits.  Then,  however,  one 
must  also  accept  all  consequences  of  this 
approach. 
It is  not compatible with the principles of the 
Common  Market  that  in  a  given  country  the 
persona!  income  tax  of  one  and  the  same 
shareholder  should  be  fixed  in  a  way  which 
differs  according to whether the dividend col-
lected  is  paid  by  companies established in his 
country  or  by  companies  established  in  other 
member countries. 
13 The way  the system  of tax  credit  operates  at 
present  is  an  inducement  to  Frenchmen  to 
invest in French and Belgians in Belgian enter-
prises,  and  contributes  to  the  fragme!J.tation 
of  the capital  markets,  while  the  aim  should 
be  fiscal  neutrality  ensuring for  investors  the 
same tax treatment irrespective of YJ'here ·they 
invèst funds  in the EEC. 
From this  point of view  the  French  and  Bel-
gian  systems  of  tax  credit  must  be  extended 
to  cover  dividend  distrilmted  by  companies 
established in the other countries of the Corn-
mon Market. 
2.  The  second  theory  questions  the  notion 
that  the tax  credit  or die fiscal  daim can  be 
regarded  as  a  reduction  of  the  shareholder's 
personal -income  tax:  It refers  in  particular 
to  the  explanatory  memorandum  attached  to 
the French law  and  to the fact  that, as  far  as 
actual  tax  alleviation  is  concerned,  this 
method  yields  the same  result  as  the German 
method  of applying a split  rate. 
In  France  as  in Belgium, about half the  cor-
poration  tax  companies  pay  on  dividends  in 
the  form  of  profits  tax  is  chargeable  to  tax 
liability  while  in  Germany it is  the  corpora-
tion tax to be  paid on  the distributed  portion 
of  profits  which  in  practice  is  reduced  to 
about half. 
To  avoid  the  granting  of  a  reduced  rate  of 
corporation  tax  to  foreign  shareholders  -
which  is  obviously  the  case  when  there  is 
an  across-the-board  reduction  of  corporation 
tax  as  in Germany - this  reduction  is  there-
fore  given  the  form  of  tax  credit  or  fiscal 
daim.  The  system  of  fiscal  daim  should 
therefore be extended to residents of the other 
Member  States  so  as  to eliminate  the  discri-
minatory  effect,  and  equilibrium  should  be 
restored  between  residents  and  non-residents 
by  providing for  the reimbursement of a sum 
equal  to the tax  credit  or  for  the  possibility 
of  charging  it  to  the tax  liability  these  resi-
dents  of the  Community may  have  in France 
and  Belgium. 
The  introduction  of  the  system  of  tax  credit 
in  its  present  form  has  discouraged  non-resi-
dents  from  purchasing  shares  in  French  or 
Belgian  companies  (to  the -extent  that  these 
companies have  eut  their dividend to increase 
self-financing)  and  has  therefore  contributed 
to  an  increase  in  the  fragmentation  of  the 
capital  markets. 
However  this  may  be,  the  system  of  tax 
credit  therefore  would  have  to  be  modified 
rapidly if it were to be made acceptable to the 
Community  as  a  whole. 
If they  want  to  maintain  the  alleviation  of 
the "economie double taxation" of dividends, 
the Member States will, in the long run, have 
to adopt a standard system  either by  applying 
in  all  the  countries  the system  of  tax  credit 
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amended  as  described  above  or  by  applying 
in  all  the  countries  the  system  of  split  rates 
at  the  moment  in  force  in  Germany.  To 
arrive at  this  end  other and  simpler  methods 
may in addition be  considered, as  for instance 
the  ones  previously  ni.entioned  in  the section 
on  the  approximation  of the  corporation  tax. 
If the systems  of tax credit and  split rates  do 
in  fact  reduce  "double  economie  taxation", 
they do not appear to appeal to the sharehol-
ders  to  the  extent  expected,  nor  have  they 
solved the problem of the excessive preference 
given  by  companies  to  loans  for  financing 
operations. 
C.  Tu  treatment  of  investments  made  through 
financlal  intermediarles 
When investments are made through financial 
intermediaries  it musr be  possible to  pass  the 
accruing  investment  income on  to  individuals 
or other institutions as  though they had made 
the  investment  direct,  in  such  a  way  as  to 
avoid  penalizing, from the tax point of view, 
persons  who  prefer  to  ·have  their  savings 
administered  by  expert intermediaries.  "Fis-
cal  transparency"  must  permit  the  ultimate 
beneficiary  to  set  against  other  income  tax 
liability  any  withholding  tax  which  has  not 
. already  been  refunded  or  allowed  to  the 
intermediary;  it must also  predude the impo-
sition  of additional tax on investment income 
in  the  hands  of the  intermediary.  This  is  a 
principle  which  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent 
as  already  been  observed  in  the  tax  legisla-
. tion  of  all  countries,  particularly with  regard 
to  intermediaries  which  are  under  the statu-
tory  obligation  to  pursue  a  policy  of  very 
diversified  investment  and  in  cases  where 
the  intermediary  is  a  company  holding  a 
major participation in another company.  The 
example  of several  Member States  shows  that 
it would be of advantage to apply the principle 
of "non bis  in idem" (not twice in the same 
matter)  as  a  general  rule  to  all  investments 
made  through  financial  intermediaries. 
D.  Preferential  .treatmeat  of  certala  holding 
compaaies 
Certain  objections  raised  in  the  EEC  in  this 
respect  mainly  concern  Luxembourg  holding 
companies.  · These  are  companies  whose 
strictly financial activities consist principally in 
buying,  administering,  exploiting  and  selling 
securities  (shares, company rights, bonds, etc.) 
and  patents  and  in  floating loans.  Indepen-
dently of the advantages these companies may 
also be offered from a financial point of view, 
they  are  granted  preferential  tax  treatment. 
In  Luxembourg  these  companies  pay  no  tax 
on  their  incomes.  They  are  subject  to the 
payment  of  only  a  very  moderate  annual 
charge  and  are  also  exempt from  withholdirig_ 
s~-~ s- ~967. tax  on the profits they distribute.  However, 
they cannot daim for  or recover any tax with-
held  on the income  they  collect,  nor  do  they 
qualify for  the application of conventions  for 
the avoidance  of  double  taxation. 
Exemption from corpor1uion  tax seems  reason-
able with regard  to the dividends which have 
already been subject to profits tax in the hands 
of the distributing company.  This is  not  an 
arrangement  peculiar  to Luxembourg.  What 
may  be  objectionable  is  the  extension  of tax 
exemption  - as  applicable  to  Luxembourg 
holding  companies  - either  to  capital  gains 
realized  upon  the  sale  of  securities  or  to 
bond interest or patent royalties which in prin-
ciple  are  not  liable  to  tax  in  the  hands  of 
the  borrower or  of  the  patentee  respectively. 
Interest on loans floated  by Luxembourg hold-
ing  companies  is  exempt  from  withholding 
tax.  This exemption, however, does  not suf-
fice  to  explain  the  large  number  of  loans 
floated  nor  is  it  a  special  arrangement  exist-
ing  in  Luxembourg  only.  There  are  other 
Member States  which do  not withhold tax  on 
bond  interest  either  as  a  general  rule  or  in 
special  cases,  as  for  instance  when  the  loan 
has  been  floated  abroad.  ln  Luxembourg  it 
loo"ks  as  if ease of access  to the capital market 
is  the key  to the heavy  volume of borrowing. 
From a  strictly fiscal  point of view,  the solu-
tion  to  these  problems  would  consist  in  har-
monizing  the  relevant  laws  in  the  Member 
States. 
However,  the  problem  cannot  be  solved  by 
fiscal  means  without  due  regard  to  general 
factors,  the  Luxembourg  holding  companies 
being often used to maintain appreciable funds 
in  the  EEC  or to  introduce  them from  non-
member countries. 
Another requirement would be a common atti-
rude on the part of the Member States towards 
certain  non-member  countries  (e.g.  Switzer-
land),  where  companies  of  this  type  operate 
under very advantageous tax arrangements, the 
objective  being  to  avoid  rendering  certain 
companies  of  non-member  States  still  more 
attractive. 
Certain  Member  States  have  tried  to  combat 
unilaterally this  form of tax evasion.  A  Bel-
gian  law  of  1954,  for  instance,  forbids  the 
deduction from taxable profits of the royalties 
and  bond  interest paid to  a  holding company 
set  up abroad  and  operating under tax  arran-
gements  which are  not subject to general law, 
unless the taxpayer proves that this remittance 
is  made in  connection  with true and  genuine 
transactions  and  stays  within  normal  limits. 
The  same  considerations  have  led  France  to 
charge  in  these  cases  an  irrecoverable  wÙh-
holding  tax  ( 24%  on  royalties,  2 5 %  on 
interest). 
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The  questions  referred  to  above  can  be  set-
tled  only  gradually,  with  due  regard  to  their 
monetary,  financial  and  economie  implica-
tions.  The introduction, during a first stage, 
of a compulsory withholc:jing  tax charged at a 
harmonized  rate  on all  bond  interest,  as  pro-
posed  in  an  earlier  chapter,  might  represent 
a  first  step togards  a solution. 
II. Industrial combination 
The tax  problems  raised  by  industrial combi-
nation vary with the forms combination takes. 
Combination may  be  effected  in  widely vary-
ing ways;  from  the point of view  of taxation 
the phenomenon  may  be classified  under two 
headings: 
i)  The  merger  of  companies,  i.e.  the 
regrouping into a larger legal unit (merger by 
take-over  or  by  the  establishment  of  a  new 
company); 
ii)  The acquisition of a holding, i.e. the pur-
chase  of  an  interest in  another company by  a 
company  wishing  to  establish  a  parent  com-
pany/subsidiary  relationship  or  to  create  a 
holding company. 
These  two  types  of combination  are  not used 
to  the same extent in all  six countries;  this is 
due  only  to  the  differences  in  company  law 
(mergers  automatically  entailing  the  dissolu-
tion  of  the company  or the  companies  being 
taken  over  are  unknown  in  the  Netherlands) 
but also  to  differences  in the economie struc-
ture,  the  degree  of  concentration  already 
reached, the size  of enterprises, and industrial 
and commercial practices. 
In  the  Community  context  both  phenomena 
call  for  consideration.  lt should  be  borne 
in  mind  that: 
i)  Mergers  are  generally  impeded  by  the 
cost  of the transaction  itself,  and 
ii)  Acquisition  of  holdings  is  not  impeded 
by  the  cost  of  the  transaction  itself;  in  this 
case  it is  the tax rules  subsequently applicable 
to  the  group  (parent  company  and  subsidia-
ries)  which may  constitue an obstacle to com-
bination. 
A.  Mergers 
The types  of merger which, depending on the 
Member State, are at  the moment to be found 
in the Community can  be  classified under two 
main  headings: 
i)  The p1.1rely  "legal" merger by  the setting 
up  of  a  new  company  or  by  take-over  (and 
possibly  a  company split)  entailing the disso-
lution of the  acquired  company; 
15 ii)  The  partial  or  complete  acquisition  of 
assets  against issue of company securities with-
out  dissolution of the acquired company. 
The main  direct  taxation  problems  raised  by 
these types  of transaction may be divided into 
three  categories: 
i)  Those affecting the acquired company; 
ii)  Those  affecting  the  acquiring  company; 
iii)  Those  affecting  the  shareholders  of  the 
acquired  company. 
1.  As  regards  the  acquired  company,  the 
problems  of  capital  gains  on  fixed  assets 
represent the  main  tax  obstacle: 
a)  If the acquired  company  is  dissolved,  the 
profits not yet  taxed and particularly any cai?i-
tal  gains  previously  concealed  and  now  dls-
closed  normally attract tax  immediately  und~r 
the  rules  on  company liquidation.  To avo1d 
such  heavy  taxation, which would make  mer-
gers  impossible  even  at  national  lev  el,  the 
Member  States  generally  grant  preferential 
treatment  consisting  in  the  postponement  of 
taxation  until  the  time  when  the  capital 
gains have in fact  been_ realized by  the  acq~ir­
ing  company:  no  tax  1s  charged  at  the  ume 
of  merger,  but  the  acquiring  company  must 
calculate  depreciation  and  subsequent  cap1tal 
gains  in respect  of the assets  acquired  accord 
ing  to  the  value  at  which  they  had  been 
carried  in  the  balance  sheet  of  the  acqUlred 
company.  Sometimes  a  combined  system  is 
applied which  provides  for  either the postpo-
nement  of  taxation,  the  phasing  of  tax  pay-
ment  over  a  number  of  years  or  immediate 
payment of tax  at  a  reduced  rate. 
b)  If the acquired company is  not dissolved, 
the  take-over  none  the  less  gives  rise  to 
capital  gains  in  respect  of fixed  assets  result-
ing  from  the  difference  between  the  book 
value  and  the  real  value  of  the  assets  trans-
ferred.  The  san1e  problem  therefore  arises 
for capital gains realized  not as  a result of the 
dissolution  but  in  the  course  of  busmess 
operations.  These  gains  are  normally  part 
of the taxable profits.  As  in the case  of mer-
gers  affecting  only  the  legal  statu~  of  ~he 
firms  concerned, the  Member States  m  wh1ch 
such  operations  are  effected  have  adopted 
interna! measures  to avoid such  an  immediate 
charging of tax at  the normal rate. 
International  mergers  involving  the  dissolu-
tion  of  the  acquired  company  may,  in  addi-
tion to the  problem of capital gains, give rise 
to  the  problem  of  the  liquidation  increment 
realized  by  the  members  when  the  dissolved 
company distributes its assets.  The exemption 
of  this  increment  from  taxation  in  the  case 
of mergers is  reasonable  because  no assets  are 
distributed to the members and the increment 
is  in  a  way  transferred  to the acquiring  corn-
lEi 
pany,  the  charging  of  tax  being  postponed 
until this company is  dissolved.  The applica-
tion  of  this  rule  to  cases  of  international 
mergers  does  not appear  to raise  major  diffi-
culties  in  so  far  as  the ·increment  is  treated 
as  investment incarne - (dividend) - which 
is  the  practice  in  most  member  countries. 
The State of the acquired company may, at the 
time  of  dissolution  of  the  foreign  company 
making  the  acquisition,  tax  the  liquidation 
increment to the extent it is  distributed to its 
residents  (subject  to  the  charging  of  a  with-
holding tax in the other State).  But this does 
not  apply  in  a  country  which,  like  Belgium, 
taxes  the  liquidation  increment  at  the  level 
of  the  dissolved  company  and  not  in  the 
hands of that company's members.  However, 
this  problem  could  be  solved  unilaterally  as 
it  concerns  only  Belgium. 
2.  As  regards  the  acquiring  company,  the 
obstacles  appeàr  to  be  much  less  serious,  at 
least  if none of the companies involved holds 
shares  in other parties to the merger. 
A  problem  may  however  arise  in  connection 
with  the  merger  premium.  This  premium 
represents  the  difference  between  the  real 
value  of the  acquired  assets  and  the  increase 
in  the  nominal  capital  to  caver  these  assets. 
It represents the portion of undisclosed capital 
gains  and  reserves  backing  the  new  shares. 
As  a  general  rule  this  premium  appears  to 
escape corporation tax in the ·various countries. 
Certain  difficulties  do,  however,  arise  if one 
of the two companies hold shares in the other. 
If the  acquired  company  holds  shares  in  the 
acquiring  company,  the  corresponding  shares 
received  through  the  take-over  must  be  can-
celled1 unless  the acquiring company is allow-
ed  to  hold  its  own  shares.  Conversely,  i.e. 
if  the acquiring company  is  a  shareholder  of 
the  acquired  company,  the  shares  must  be 
either  cancelled  or  exchanged  against  shares 
of  the  acquiring  company  if  the  latter  is 
allowed  to  hold  its  own  shares. 
These  operations  are  apt  to  yield  capital 
gains; the absence of preferential arrangements 
then  leads  to  double  taxation  because  in 
practice  the  same  capital  gains  are  taxed 
twice - once  at  the time  of  acquisition  and 
once  at  the  time of  cancellation  or exchange 
of shares. 
3.  For the shareholders of the acquired com-
pany exchanging their shares against shares of 
the  acquiring  company,  the question  arises  as 
to  whether  this  transaction  can  attract  tax. 
Taxation  at  this  stage  may  constitute  an 
obstacle  to  company  mergers  since  it  may 
induce  certain  shareholders,  paricularly  those 
owning large  blacks  of  shares,  to  oppose the 
merger. 
1  Or  disposed  of  as  appropriate. 
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a  case  of  acquisition  of  assets  where  shares 
are handed over in exchange while the acquir-
ed company is  not dissolved;  the shareholders 
of this company keep these shares. 
Lastly,  it  must  be  remembered  that  mergers 
occasion  registration  tax  problems.  In  this 
respect  the  proposed  directive  submitted  by 
the  Commission  to  the  Council  will  ensure 
the harmonization  desirable  from  a  Commu-
nity point  of view  and  preclude double  taxa-
tion between Member States. 
Several  factors  must  be  taken  into  account  if 
a solution  is  to be found  to the tax problem 
created  by  international company mergers. 
a)  Any solution must  be  based  on the prin-
ciple  that  sorne  measure  of  tax  relief  should 
be  granted; this does  not mean that the States 
are  going  to  lose  revenue,  since  there  have 
been  no  international  mergers  so  far;  there 
would,  however,  be  sorne  "loss  of  profit". 
The  principle  should  be  accepted  by  all  the 
Member  States. 
b)  There  is,  moreover,  general  agreement 
that  there  can  be no question  of applying to 
international  mergers  more  favourable  tax 
rules  than  to mergers  at  national level. 
c)  However,  an  examination  of  the  various 
problems  set  out  above  has  shown  that  it  is 
not  possible  purely  and  simply  to  extend  to 
international mergers the various arrangements 
currently applied to mergers in the individual 
Member  States,  because: 
i)  ln the first place, these arrangements vary 
according  to  country;  an  extension  may  lead 
to  mergers  which  are  always  effected  in  the 
same  direction,  i.e.  to  the  detriment  of  the 
country with the most liberal rules, and 
ii)  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  in general 
based  on  the postponement of  taxation  (pro-
vided  the same  assets  remain  with the acquir-
ing  company);  such  a  system  would  be  too 
complicated  for  application  at  international 
lev  el. 
A  more  simple  system  must  therefore  be 
worked  out,  acceptable  by  a1l  countries  at 
international  leve!  and  providing  a  suitable 
basis  for  the  harmonization  of  the  national 
arrangements. 
In  principle,  this  solution  could  consist  in 
determining, at  the time  of merger,  the total 
capital  gains  liable  to  tax;  this  total  would 
then  be  taxed  but payment  of  the tax  to the 
State of the acquired company would be spread 
over  ten  years,  the  acquiring  company  being 
entitled, of course, to show in its balance sheet 
all  acquired  assets  at their  real  vaule. 
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Ten years would seem roughly the right length 
of  time,  having  due  regard  to all  the  items 
likely  to  appreciate  in  value,  from  stocks  to 
land,  irrespective  of whether  these  items  can 
be  written  off or not. 
An  obj.ection  to  this  suggestion,  however,  is 
that  certain  items,  particularly  those  which 
cannot  be  written  off  such  as  stocks,  land  or 
securities,  account  for  a  major  part  of  the 
assets:  in  these  cases  the  proposed  overall 
calculation  would  be  too  remote  from  reality. 
lt would,  therefore,  be  preferable  to  provide 
for  certain  modifications  in relation  with the 
items which do appreciate in value: 
i)  The capital gains  on  items  qualifying for 
depreciation  would  always  be  shown  separa-
rely  and  would  remain  taxable,  the  payment 
of  tax  normally  being spread  over  ten  years; 
ii)  For land  and certain  items which cannot 
be written off the enterprises could be  offered 
. a  choice  between: 
Not  disclosing  capital  gains  and  taking 
advantage  of  the  postponement  of  taxation, 
the  items  being  shown  at  the  same  value  in 
the  acquiring  or  new  company;  iq  this  case 
a  procedure would  have  to  be  worked  out to 
enable  the  State  of the  acquired  company  to 
exercise  if  necessary  its  right  of  taxation,  or 
Disclosing  capital  gains  and  paying  th~ tax 
immediately  at  a  reduced  rate,  the acquiring 
company  then  being  able  to  carry  in  its 
balance sheet the corresponding items at their 
real  value; 
a)  If realized  on  participations,  the  capital 
gains disclosed could be made subject to: 
Either  a  tax  to  be  paid  in  instalments,  or 
A  tax  to  be  paid  immedrately  at  a  reduced 
rate. 
b)  No  special  arrangement  would  then  be 
applied  to  stocks,  the  capital  gains  disclosed 
being in principle taxable  immediately at the 
normal  rate. 
c)  Tax-exempt  general  or  special  reserves 
built up by  the  acquired  company  would,  on 
the occasion  of the merger, have  to be  taxed 
only  if they  lost  their  economie  justification. 
If this  were not the case  it would  have to be 
possible  for  the  acquiring  or  new  company 
to  bring them in without paying tax. · 
d)  If one of the two companies holds shares 
in the other one and  if these  shares  must be 
cancelled  or  exchanged,  the  capital  gains 
resulting  from  these  transactions  should,  to 
preclude economie double taxation, be exemp-
ted  from  tax  as  is  the general  practice  under 
the  preferential  national  arrangéments. 
e)  For  the  shareholders  of  the  acquired 
company the exchange of the shares  they pos-
sess  in  this  company  against  shares  of  the 
acquiring  or  new  company  is  nothing  but  a 
17 ·simple  technical  transaction  from  which  they 
draw  no  rnaterial  advantages.  It  should 
be  recognized  - as  is  generally the case  for 
mergers  within  a  single  State  - that  this 
exchange  should  not  attract  tax,  at  least  as 
· long as  the new shares  are not sold  and - if 
the party involved is  an enterprise - provided 
that the balance sheet of this enterprise shows 
the  new  shares  at  the  value  of the  old  ones. 
Obviously the same solutions could be applied 
to  che  partial  or  total  acquisition  of  assets 
against  che  issue  of shares,  acquisitions  which 
give  rise  to  sorne  of  the  above-rnentioned 
problerns. 
/) ·  The  result  of  an  international  rnerger 
usually  being  the  conversion  of  a  company 
into  a  permanent  establishment  of  a  foreign 
company,  such  an  establishment  should  not 
atcract  heavier  taxation  than  a  legally  inde-
pendent  company  (subsidiary).  Here,  it 
would  be useful if  certain national provisions 
were  amended  which  apply  to  permanent 
establishments  and  are  of  a  more  or  less 
discrirninatory  nature,  such  as: 
i)  Taxation  of  profits  of  permanent  estab-
lishments  of  foreign  cornpanies  at  a  standard 
rate  of  49%  in  Germany  and  ac  a  rate  of 
35%  in  Belgium; 
ii)  The tax  procedures  applied  in  France  to 
profits  distributed  by  permanent  establish-
ments  of  foreign  cornpanies; 
iii)  The  French  and  Italian  rules  according 
to which all  incorne of national origin collect-
ed  by a non-resident is  charged to any perma-
nent establishment  the non-resident  may  own 
in  that  country  "Power  of  attraction  of  the 
permanent establishment"). 
Such  provisions  are  liable  to  constituee  an 
obstacle to the building up of large permanent 
establishments. 
B.  Acquisition  of  holdings 
The acquisition  of  shares  of  one company  by 
another is  the most comrnon forrn of industrial 
combination;  this  rnethod  can  be  ernployed 
at  both  national  and  international  level 
because  in  general  i  t  does  not  raise  an y  tax 
problerns  at  the  moment of transaction. 
However,  the  escablished  fiscal  arrangements 
applicable  to  interlocking  cornpanies  may. 
prove an obstacle to combination in this form, 
parcicularly  at  Comrnunity  level,  if the  total 
tax  burden  borne  by  the  two  cornpanies  is 
too  rnuch  in excess  of  what would have  been 
the  liability  of  a  single  company. 
1.  Taxation of profits 
For this  reason  the tax  arrangements  govern-
ing the transfer of  profits from one company 
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to  another  have  had  to be  specially  adjusted 
in  the  individual  countries  so  as  to  rnake  it 
impossible  for  the  same  profits  to  be  taxed 
successively  in  two  or more cornpanies. 
Four  rnernber  countries  have,  for  instance, 
made special arrangements applicable to parent 
cornpanies and subsidiaries  (  Schachtelprivileg) 
under the terrns of which the dividends collect-
ed  by  one company are practically tax-exernpt 
in  this  company  if  they  arise  from  a  major 
holding in another company (10%  in France, 
25%  in  Gerrnany,  the  Netherlands  and 
Luxembourg).  A  fifth  country,  Belgiurn, 
applied  the  general  rule  that  the  dividends 
collected  by  a  company  do  not  forrn  part  of 
ics  taxable  profits  and  therefore  escape  taxa-
tion  irrespective  of  the  size  of  the' holding. 
Lastl  y,  in  Itafy  double  taxation  is  of lirnited 
incidence  because  corporation  tax  is  only  a 
supplernentary  tax  raised  at  a  low  rate  in 
addition  to  schedular  tax  which  in  turn  is 
levied onl  y once on the sarne  profit. 
But  these  exceptions  do  not  always  apply 
when  the  subsidiary  is  a  foreign  company. 
While  France,  the  Netherlands  and  Belgiurn 
rnake  no distinction  according to whether the 
subsidiary  of a  national parent company  is  a 
national or a  foreign  company,  Gerrnany and 
the Netherlands refuse these  cornpanies  equal 
treatrnent unless there are bilateral conventions 
to  this  effect;  owing to  the  special  nature  of 
the ltalian system, ltalian parent cornpanies are 
always  subject  to  sorne  rneasure  of  double 
taxation  whether  the  subsidiary  is  a  foreign 
or a  national company. 
It is  therefore  indispensable  that the  national 
arrangements should  be  applied systernatically 
"across the frontiers  between Mernber States", 
and  there  do  not  seern  to  be  any  major 
obstacles  in  the  way  of this;  where  they  fail 
to rernove all obstacles to company regrouping 
these  arrangements  should  also  be  irnproved 
within  the  rnember  countries. 
lt can;  however,  be  conceded  that - at  least 
at the present stage of the Cornrnon Market -
the  fact  that the  minimum  holding  required 
if cornpanies  wish to daim the benefit of the 
arrangements  provided  for  parent  cornpanies 
and  subsidiaries  varies  from  one  Mernber 
State to the other is  not a rnajot irnpedirnent: 
an  industrial  combination  operation  presup-
poses  relatively  large  holdings  and  the  mini-
mum holdings generally raise  no problern. 
2.  Withholding tax and fiscal  claim 
There  are  other  aspects  of  established  tax 
arrangements  which  also  have  a  bearing  on 
industrial cornbination.  Withholding tax  on 
dividends  in the six countries  and the system 
of fiscal  daim  (cax  credit)  granted  to  French 
shareholders  (  individuals  or  cornpanies)  in 
respect of dividend received from French corn-
panies  can  influence projected amalgamations. 
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tax  on  distributed  dividend  is  charged  only 
once;  in  Germany,  Luxembourg  and  the 
Netherlands  withholding  tax  is  not  charged 
when dividend is  distributed by the subsidiary 
to the parent company but when it is redistrib-
uted by  the parent company to its  own share-
holders.  In  Belgium  (and,  until  the  recent 
elimination  of  withholding  tax  as  between 
French  taxpayers,  also  in  France),  however, 
the  withholding  tax  is  levied  at  the  time  of 
distribution  by  the  subsidiary  to  the  parent 
company  and  this  tax  is  subsequently  set 
against  the  withholding  tax  due  on  the divi-
dends  distributed  by  the  parent  company. 
The  last-mentioned  procedure  is  tantamount 
to an inducement to parent companies to redis-
tribute the dividend  received  from  their sub-
sidiaries  if  they  do  not  want  to  !ose  their 
right to daim for  tax  paid. 
The  system  of  tax  credit  currently  in  opera-
tion  in  France  has  the  same  effect:  if  the 
parent company does  not immediately distrib-
ute  the  dividends  received  from  the  subsid-
iary,  the shareholders  of  the  parent  company 
practically lose the tax credit attached to these 
dividends. 
In  sorne  member  countries  the  profits  of the 
subsidiary  can  thus  be  transferred  freely  to 
the  parent  company,  which  can  then  use 
them in the best  interests  of the group, while 
in  other  countries  such  transfer  would  prac-
tically  call  for  an  immediate  redistribution  if 
a  provisional  or final  penalization of a  fiscal 
nature  was  to  be  avoided. 
In  the first  case  such  arrangements may entai! 
a strengthening of the position of parent corn-
panics  with regard  to their subsidiaries  while 
in  the  second  case  the  result  is  the  opposite; 
in  view  of  the  need  to  promote  industrial 
combination in the Community, it is  not desi-
rable  that  these  conflicting  arrangements 
should  exist  side  by  side. 
b)  Another  aspect  of  current  tax  arrange-
ments  which  may  affect  amalgamation  is the 
way  in  which  the  various  member  countries 
charge  withholding  tax  if  the  enterprises 
concerned  are  parent  companies  and  subsi-
diaries  established  in different  member coun-
tries.  In  this  respect  it must  be  remembered 
that: 
i)  International  double  taxation  which 
results from the practice of charging withhold-
ing tax is  not always  avoided between member 
countries  because  the withholding  tax  is  not 
always  fully  set  off against  total tax  liability 
in  the  country  receiving  the  dividends;  this 
general  observation  also  applies  to  the  case 
of parent companies  and subsidiaries; 
ii)  Even  if double  taxation  were completely 
avoided,  there  still  might  be a  case,  varying 
from  country  to  country,  of  inducement  to 
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parent  companies  to  redistribute  profits  if 
parent company and subsidiary are not of the 
same  nationality. 
The problem  of  inducement  to  redistribution 
and  of  double  taxation  raised  by  the  current 
practice  of  charging  withholding  tax  on  the 
transfer  of dividends  from a subsidiary to  the 
parent  company  would  be  solved  if  the 
solution proposed in the Chapter on withhold-
ing  tax  were  adopted,  whereby  withholding 
tax is  not to  be  charged or is  to be  reimbursed 
if the benefifiary is  exempt from  tax as  is  the 
case  for  parent companies.  Generally  speak-
ing,  the  tax  rules  governing  redistribution 
should  be  harmonized  if a  simation  is  to  be 
avoided  in  which  amalgamations  take  place 
only  among  companies  established  in  the 
countries  where  tax  legislation  does  not  caU 
for  redistribution.  The  best  solution  would 
be to drop the redistribution requirement alto-. 
gether:  there  is  sorne  doubt  as  to whether  it 
is  of any  real  economie value;  it may  in  fact 
constitute  an  obstacle  to the optimum admin-
istration  of financial  resources  in a group. 
III.  Depreciation 
As  pointed  out  at  the  beginning  of  this 
memorandum,  certain  depreciation  rules 
would have to be  imposed: 
A.  Normal  depredation 
1.  Beginning  of  depreciation  period.  In 
sorne· countries  it  is  possible  to  start  writing 
off  an  asset  as  soon  as  it  has  been  ordered 
while  in  others  this  cannot  be  clone  before 
delivery is  taken or before the asset  is  actually 
used.  If the  economie  concept  of  deprecia-
tion is  taken as  a basis, it is  obvious that writ-
ing-off should start as  soon  as  an  undertaking 
has  committed  itself  to  taking  delivery  of 
an  asset. 
In  the circumstances  it appears  to  be  reason-
able  to  suggest  that  it  should  be  possible  in 
all  countries  to  write  off  the  depreciation 
taking place between the time of order·and the 
time  of  arriva!. 
To avoid the building up of tax-exempt reser-
ves,  the  amount  charged  to  depreciation 
before  delivery  is  taken  should,  however,  not 
exceed  the  advance  payments  made. 
ln addition, a special amount could be written 
off  upon  delivery  representing  depreciation 
between  time  of  order  and  time  of  arriva! 
and  accounting  for  the  total  of  such  depre-
ciation if no advance  payment had been made 
or accounting for  the part of depreciation  not 
yet written off if the advance payment had not 
been high enough. 
19 In  any  case,  the  first  amount  that  may  be 
charged  to  depreciation  for  the tax  perioçl  in 
which  the  beginning  of  depreciation  falls 
should  represent  depreciation  for  one  full 
year,  whether  the  depreciation  period  stans 
at  the  beginning  or  at  the  end  of  this  tax 
period. 
2.  Methods of depreciation.  In the six coun-
tries  firms  should  be  allowed  to  use  either 
the  straight-line  method  or  a  decreasing-
charge meihod of depreciation.  A decreasing-
charge  method,  however,  should  normally  be 
applied  to  buildings  in  special  cases  only. 
The rate of depreciation  acc~rding to a decreas-
ing-charge  method  should  moreover  not  be 
higher  than  two  and  a  half  times  the  cor-
responding  straight-line  depreciation  rate. 
3.  Compulsory  nature  of depreciation.  To 
make  balance  sheets  provide  a  truer  picture, 
secure  observation  of  the rules  governing the 
carrying-over  of  losses  to  the  following  year 
and  ensure  the  desired  uniformity  in  the 
presentation  of  company  results  in  the  six 
countries  depreciation  should  in  certain 
respects  be  made  compulsory  in  all  member 
countries  even  during  periods  of  loss.  To 
this end it might be suggested  that enterprises 
should  be  required  to  charge  every  year  and 
in  all  circumstances  a  certain · amount  to 
depreciation  in such  a way  chat at the end of 
each  trading  year  the  total  amount  actually 
written  off cannot  be  lower  than  the  accrued 
total  of  depreciation  admissible  under  the 
straight-line  method,  it  being  impossible  to 
make  up !osses  later if failure  to  observe  this 
rule  leads  to  the  writing-off  of  too  low  an 
amount. 
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B.  Special  depreclatloa 
Prior consultations  should  be  held  in respect 
of measures which are considered to constituee 
a  special  incentive,  namely: 
1.  Measures  leading  to  the  speeding  up of 
depreciation to an extent not justified by tech-
nical  or economie depreciation and  to a  post-
ponement  of  the  date  at  which  tax  becomes 
due,  such  as: 
a)  A  rate  of  depreciation  according  to  a 
decreasing charge  method  which  exceeds  the 
corresponding straight-line  rate  by  more than 
rwo  and  a half times; 
b)  Depreciation  according  to  a  decreasing-
charge  method  covering  in  general  all  build-
ings; 
c)  Special  more  rapid  depreciation for  the 
benefit  of  certain  industries  or  for  exporters. 
2.  Measures  leading  to  actual  exemption  of 
profits  from  tax  such  as: 
a)  Deductions  made,  on  account  of  invest-
ments  made,  from  taxable  profits  or  even 
from  actual  tax due; 
b)  The  charging  to  depreciation  of  · an 
amount which is  higher than the historie cost. 
It  is  not  desirable  that  the  Member  States 
should  adopt  investment  incentives  not  in 
line  with  the  general  policy  defined  by  the 
institutions  of  the  Community. 
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